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Market Power in the World Market for
Soymeal  Exports
Satish Y.  Deodhar and Ian M.  Sheldon
In this article,  the degree of imperfect  competition  in the world market for  soymeal
exports is  estimated  using a structural  econometric  model. The procedure consists  of
estimating  a  demand  function  and  the industry  first-order  profit-maximization  con-
dition, from which an estimate of the  degree of market power can be retrieved. Using
a  nonlinear three-stage least  squares  procedure,  the estimate of market power shows
that  the  world  market  for  soymeal  exports  is  perfectly  competitive.  The  empirical
results  also  indicate  that this market was  competitive  even prior to entry by Argen-
tinean  firms in the mid-1970s.
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Introduction
Over the past fifteen years, industrial economics has seen  a renewed interest in empirical
analysis,  which  is  now commonly  referred  to  as  the  "new  empirical  industrial  organi-
zation"  (NEIO). This new empirical research has developed largely due to dissatisfaction
with  the  older  structure-conduct-performance  (SCP)  methods  that  dominated  empirical
work in industrial organization during the 1960s  and 1970s (Bresnahan and Schmalensee;
Bresnahan  1989).  Typically  studies  in  the NEIO  use  time-series  data  from a  single in-
dustry  to  estimate  structural  econometric  models based on firm-level  optimization.  The
approach evaluates the presence of market power in a specific  industry based on demand
and  cost functions  and  hypotheses  concerning  the  strategic  interaction  of firms:  things
which studies  based on the  SCP approach  generally failed to  specify.
Of the  various  applications  of this new  method  to  the  food  and  agricultural  sector,
only a few relate to  export markets.  Some  examples  are  Buschena and  Perloff,  coconut
oil export market;  Karp  and Perloff (1989,  1993),  rice and  coffee export markets; Love
and Murniningtyas,  wheat export market;  and Lopez and  You, Haitian  coffee exporting.
Estimating  the degree of imperfect  competition  in international  markets  is a  logical  ex-
tension of NEIO.  Recent developments  in international  trade theory emphasize  imperfect
competition's  effect on trade  and  trade policies  (Helpman  and  Krugman  1985,  1989).
The  objective  of this article  is to estimate  the degree  of imperfect  competition  in the
world market  for soymeal exports  using  a  structural  econometric  model.  The procedure
adopted draws on a method of identifying market power that has been discussed in papers
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by Bresnahan  (1982,  1989)  and Lau and applied to international  agricultural  markets by
Buschena and  Perloff and Love  and Murniningtyas.
An earlier  study by Yamazaki, Paarlberg,  and Thursby did evaluate competition in the
world  soybean  processing  industry  using  a  model  that  allowed  retrieving  a  parameter
measuring  firm  behavior  for  the  industry,  which  suggested  that  the  export  market  is
perfectly  competitive.  Yamazaki,  Paarlberg,  and Thursby,  however,  used a simple, non-
stochastic,  partial equilibrium  model which does not allow for calculating  standard errors
of the estimated degree of market power.  In addition, the previous study did not separate
the  markets  for  processed  soybean  products,  soymeal,  and  soyoil.  Although  these  are
obtained  simultaneously  in  the  processing  operation,  soymeal  and  soyoil  are  sold  in
virtually  independent markets,  with  each having  a  single identifiable  world market  (Uri,
Chomo,  and Hoskin).  Hence,  the present  study  focuses on the degree of competition  in
the soymeal  export market.1
The  Structure of the World Market for Soymeal  Exports
The world soymeal  export  market  aris  a major  agricultural  export market.  World demand
for soymeal  derives  mostly  from  the  demand  to  feed  livestock  and  manufacture  food
products.  The  world  market  for  soymeal  exports  has  increased  rapidly  from  less  than
three  million tonnes  in  1966  to approximately  29 million  tonnes in  1994,  an increase  of
more  than 800%  (American  Soya Association).  Eighty percent of the value of soybeans
is  derived from  the soymeal  market (Larson  and Rask).  In addition,  soymeal dominates
the  protein  meal  market,  accounting  for more  than  60%  of the  world  market in  1994,
there being  no major  competing  substitutes  (American  Soya Association).
In  terms of the geographic  structure  of soymeal  exports,  Larson  and Rask report  that
more  than  95%  of world  exports  are  accounted  for  by  four  countries/country  blocs:
Argentina  (20%),  the European Union (EU-12) (20%), the U.S. (20%),  and Brazil (35%).
Argentina  is  a relative  newcomer,  whose  firms  began  exporting  during  the  mid-1970s,
growing  from a 2 to a 20%  share  of the world  market over  1980 to  1990, largely at the
expense of the  market shares  of U.S.  and  Brazilian  firms.  Larson  and Rask suggest that
Argentinean and Brazilian firms have a relative competitive advantage partly due to lower
soybean  production  costs  but  also  due  to  the  use  of government  policies  designed  to
promote  the export of processed  soybeans.
On  the  face of it,  the  extent of country  participation  in  the global  trade  of soymeal
suggests  that the world market  for soymeal exports might be oligopolistic.2 Closer anal-
ysis  of the  market  structure  of soybean  processing,  however,  gives no  clear  empirical
indication  as to whether or not firms in this  market behave competitively.  In the case  of
the  U.S.,  soybean  processing  is  relatively  concentrated.  Marion  and  Kim  report  that
between  1977 and  1988, the  largest four firms'  share of soybean  crushing capacity  rose
from 46 to 76%, with the largest two firms, Archer Daniels Midland  (ADM)  and Cargill,
taking  just  over  50%.  Similarly  in  the  EU,  soybean  crushing  is  highly  concentrated.
1 An initial  attempt  was made to  conduct  a similar study on  soyoil; it was dropped,  however,  due to insufficient  variability
in  soyoil  exports to  allow  estimation  of a demand function  and  data  on prices  of rapeseed  oil,  a  substitute for  soyoil,  were
not available for the entire period  used in  the study.
2 The agricultural  trade  literature  has  tended to  focus on  the  competition  between  countries  that  dominate  the export  of
certain  agricultural  commodities  (e.g., McCalla;  Alaouze,  Watson,  and Sturgess;  Karp and McCalla;  Kolstad  and  Burris).
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Scoppola  reports  that, in  1988, the  four-firm  concentration  ratio for the EU  as  a whole
was  85%,  all of which was  accounted  for by multinational  corporations.3 For example,
Cargill,  which  accounts  for  approximately  20%  of EU  processing  capacity,  operates
plants  in France,  the Netherlands,  Spain,  and  the  U.K.;  while  ADM  has  plants  in  the
Netherlands  and  Germany  (American Soya Association).
In  contrast,  while  there  is  also  multinational  involvement  in  Brazil  and  Argentina,
Cargill accounting  for 6% of Brazilian and  17%  of Argentinean  capacity,  their soybean
processing  industries  are considerably  less  concentrated,  with the  largest four firms  ac-
counting  for  27  and  39%  of crushing  capacity  respectively  in  1994  (American  Soya
Association).  In  addition,  processing  capacity  has  expanded  in both countries  since the
1970s (Larson).
Hence,  while  soybean  processing  is  heavily  concentrated  by  country,  and  there  is
evidence  of multinational  firm involvement,  the structure of the industry worldwide can-
not be unambiguously  described  as  oligopolistic.  In addition, while  studies  have  shown
the industry has scale economies due to large fixed costs in processing (U.S. International
Trade Commission),  there also seems to be chronic excess capacity in the industry which
would tend to undermine  firms'  ability  to  extract monopoly  rents.  For example,  a  1988
U.S. Department  of Agriculture  study shows that capacity  use in Brazil during  the mid-
1980s  was  only 55%  (USDA).
Methodology  of Estimating Market Power
Suppose an industry consisting  of a number of identical firms faces world market demand
given by the following:
(1)  Qt  = Q(Pt, z,),
where  Q, is  the total  quantity  demanded,  P, is the  world  market price,  Z, is a vector of
exogenous variables such as the prices of substitutes and income,  and t is a time subscript.
Since Q, and P, are determined  simultaneously,  the demand  function can also be written
in inverse form, P, = P(Q,, Z,).  Suppose also that the aggregate  marginal  cost facing the
industry  is given by
(2)  MC, = MC(Q,, W,),
where  W,  is a vector  of exogenous variables  such  as  input costs.
Assuming  that  the  industry  is  perfectly  competitive,  equilibrium  price  and  quantity
will be determined  by
(3)  Pt = P(Qt, Z,)  = MC, = MC(Q,  W).
More generally, if the industry is imperfectly competitive, equilibrium is where perceived
industry  marginal revenue  equals  industry  marginal  cost. If industry  revenue is  defined
as R, = PQt = P(Qt, Z,)Q,,  the  equilibrium  condition can be rewritten  as:
dP
(4)  MR(A)  =  P(Qt, Z,)  + A  (Q,  Zt)Qt  = MC(Q,, W).
3 Multinationals  are commonly  associated  with  markets exhibiting  economies  of scale  and imperfect  competition  (Ethier;
Markusen).
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A can  be interpreted  as  an index  of market  power  being  exerted  in  an industry,  that
is, the  wedge,  in equilibrium,  between  industry price and  industry marginal  cost (Bres-
nahan  1982).  The value of A falls in the range  0  - A - 1;  if the industry  is  perfectly
competitive,  the parameter  A = 0, and  (4) becomes  the usual condition that price equals
marginal  cost. If the industry  is  either a monopoly  or  firms  demonstrate perfectly  col-
lusive behavior,  A =  1, and  (4) becomes the normal expression  for a monopoly markup.
Intermediate  values  of A reflect  oligopolistic outcomes  where the markup  over marginal
cost is less than the monopoly  mark-up;  for example,  A will take the  value  1/n if the n
firms  in the  market behave  in Cournot-Nash  fashion.  The reason  for the  Cournot-Nash
value of A = l/n becomes apparent once a connection is made between the market power
parameter  A and  the concept  of conjectural  variations.
This  connection  is  illustrated  briefly  here using  a  simple  duopoly  model.  Let firm  1
expect  firm  2  to produce  q4  units  of output.  If firm  1 produces  q1 units  of output,  the
total  output it expects  to be  sold in the market  is  Q = q,  + q . The profit maximizing
problem for firm  1 is then:
(5)  max q {P(Q)ql  - cl(q)  },
where  P(Q) is  the  inverse  demand  function,  and  c,(ql)  is  firm  l's total  cost function.
Differentiating  (5)  with respect  to  q,  and  after some  manipulation,  the  first-order  con-
dition is
(6)  P(Q)  +  +MC,(ql),
where MC,(.) is firm l's marginal  cost,  q2 is  the equilibrium value  of qe,  and dq 2ldq, is
the conjectural  variations  term.  It summarizes  how  firm  1 conjectures  firm 2  will vary
its  output when  firm  1 makes  a  small  change  in  output.  Denote  this  term  as  u  If the
firms are  symmetric,  that is,  they have  identical  costs  and,  therefore,  produce the  same
level  of output,  then equation  (6) can be generalized  to n firms  as:4
(7)  P(Q) +  d  Q  = MC.
dQ2  n
Recall  equation  (4)  and compare  with (7).  These two  are identical  equations, where the
index of market  power is defined  as  A =  [1  +  (n  - 1)v]  / n.  It is  obvious that if firms
behave in Cournot-Nash  fashion, that is, v = 0, then the corresponding value of A is  l/n.
Hence,  A is interpreted  as  an index of the degree of market power,  in which is nested a
conjectural  variations  parameter.
In  order  to  identify  A in  an  econometric  model,  the  method  outlined  in Bresnahan
(1982) is followed.  The world export demand function in (1)  is specified in the following
form:
(8)  Qt = a  + aP, +  a,2 Z 1 +  a3Z2t  +  a4Z3,  +  a5 ,PZ 3t +  t,,
where  Q, is  the  quantity  of soymeal  sold  in the  export market,  Pt is  the  real  soymeal
price,  Zn,  (n=  1, ... ,  3)  are exogenous variables  (defined  explicitly in the next section),
4 This is clearly a restrictive  assumption,  but one that is invariably made in the literature.  The usual justification being that
an uneven distribution of firm  sizes can be translated  into  a distribution of symmetric-sized  firms through using the numbers
equivalent of the Herfindahl  index.
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and et is the error term. This form of demand function, used in earlier studies by Buschena
and Perloff and Love  and Murniningtyas,  is linear in coefficients  but contains the inter-
active  term PtZ 3t.
Following  Bresnahan  (1989)  and  Buschena  and  Perloff,  suppose  that  the  aggregate
marginal  cost of production  takes the following  functional form:
(9)  MCt  =  yeQt  W  +  +  3W2t.
Marginal  cost  is assumed  to  vary with respect  to  output Qt  and  W,,  (n= 1,  ... ,  2)  are
proxies  for the real  input costs  of producing soymeal.
Equation  (9)  can now  be  substituted  into the  profit-maximizing  condition  (4).  Rear-
ranging  terms,  the following  equation is derived:
(10)  P, = y 1Q, +  ytW1 +  3W2 +  8  t  +  E,
where  the  variables  are  defined  as  above,  and  et  is  the  error  term.  The  market  power
parameter  in this equation is the  coefficient  8 with a negative  sign, that  is, A =  -8.
As shown by Bresnahan  (1982)  and Lau,  the interactive  term adds  some nonlinearity
to the demand function so that A can be identified.5 If 'Z3 changes, the demand curve will
rotate  around  the equilibrium  point and trace  out the  supply  relation,  which  allows cal-
culating  the  degree  of market  power.  If no  cross-product  variable  is  included  in the
demand  function,  the coefficient  of Qt in equation  (10) reduces to  (y, + 8/al), and hence,
an identification problem  occurs for  8 as  7y and  8 cannot be  estimated  separately.
Data and Regression  Analysis
In order  to  evaluate the  degree  of market power,  equations  (8)  and  (10)  are  estimated.
In its complete  form,  (8)  is specified  as:
(11)  Qt  =  ao  +  Pt  +  +  e 2Zt  + a3Z2 +  a4Z3,  +  aPZ  +  a6Dlt +  aT,  t +  ,
where  Q, and P, are as  already  defined;  Zlt is the real  price of a key  substitute product,
fishmeal.  Fishmeal was  chosen over other protein meal substitutes due to fishmeal having
been the second-largest  traded protein meal in the world, and  data were available for the
time-period  of this study.  Z2, is  the  rest of the  world  (ROW)  population  that excludes
the  population  of Argentina,  Brazil,  and  the  U.S.  Although  firms  in the EU  are major
exporters  of soymeal,  its population  is included because  there is  some intra-EU trade in
soymeal (Crowder and Davison).  Similarly, Z3, is an index of the gross  domestic product
of the ROW.  T, represents  a trend variable  and Dt is a dummy  variable  that takes  into
account the exogenous price  increases that occurred in  1973 due to the oil shock. It takes
a value  of one  for  1973  and  zero  otherwise.
Similarly,  equation  (10)  in its complete  form is  specified as  follows:
(12)  P, =  y1 ,  +  y  2W,  +  y3W 2 - +  a  +  3 +  y4D 1t  +  y5Tt  + Et
5 It  should be noted that  Bresnahan  (1982)  outlined the  basic principle  of identifying  A;  while Lau provided proof of the
conditions under  which identification  will  occur.
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Table  1.  Description  of Variables
Variable  Description
P,  Real price of soymeal  at the port of Rotterdam:
$/tonne cif
Qt  Total world soymeal exports:  thousand tonnes/annum
Zl,  Real price of fishmeal  at the port of Hamburg:  $/tonne
fob
Z21  World population except  that of Argentina,  Brazil,  and
U.S.
Z3,  Index of world gross domestic  product except  Argenti-
na, Brazil,  and U.S.
Wi,  Real price of soybeans  at the port of Rotterdam:
$/tonne cif
W2,  Real  ocean freight rate,  average of Argentina-Rotter-
dam and  U.S.-Rotterdam  rates:  $/tonne
Di,  Oil shock dummy:  1 for  1973,  0 otherwise
D2,  Dummy for Argentina's  entry:  0 until  1974,  1 since
1975
T,  Time trend
t  1966-93
Note:  All  variables  except  dummies  are  expressed  in  logarithmic
form.
The  additional  variables  Wt  and  W2, are  the  real  soybean  price,  and  the  real  average
ocean  freight  rate  respectively.  Until  1974,  the  world  export  market  for  soymeal  was
dominated by firms from Brazil, the EU-12,  and the U.S. Since  1975 firms from Argen-
tina  have increased  their market  share which,  by 1990,  had reached more than  20%.  In
order to  see if there  is any structural  change in the degree  of market power after Argen-
tinean  firms entered  the world  export  market,  the  coefficient  8 is  expressed  as  a linear
function  of a structural  dummy  8 =  60  +  38D 2t. D2t is the structural  dummy which takes
a value of zero prior to  1975 and  one since  1975,  indicating  Argentinean firms'  entry to
the  export  market.  This  implies  that  prior  to  such  entry,  8=S0; therefore,  the  market
power  parameter  A=-5o.  After  the  entry  of Argentinean  firms,  8=50+81;  therefore,
A=-(8o+ A).
The variables used in the estimation procedure  are summarized  and described in table
1.  Annual  data on aggregate  quantities  of world  soymeal  exports  (Q,)  were collected  for
the  period  1966  to  1993  from  a  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  staff report  (Crowder
and  Davison).  Prices  of soymeal  (P,), fishmeal  (Zlt) and  soybeans  (Wt,)  were  collected
for the  same period  from  various  issues  of the  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  publi-
cations:  Oilseeds and Products, World  Oilseed Situation and Outlook,  and  Oilseeds:
World Markets &  Trade; and  from various  issues  of the Food and  Agriculture  Organi-
zation publication: Production  Yearbook.  Data on ocean freight rates (W,)  were collected
from various  issues  of the Food  and  Agriculture Organization  publication:  Trade Year-
book.  Population  figures  (Z2 ,)  were  constructed  from  a U.S.  Department  of Agriculture
staff report (Urban  and Nightingale).  Similarly, indices  for gross  domestic product were
constructed from the United Nations  publication:  Trends in International  Distribution  of
Gross World Product. The U.S.  consumer  price index  was  used to  deflate  the  nominal
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Table 2.  N3SLS  Estimation of  the World Soymeal
Export Model,  1966-93
Coefficient  t-Ratio
Soymeal  export demand:
Intercept  84.41*  2.36
Real  soymeal price: P,  -10.13*  -2.29
Real  fishmeal price: Z,,  0.59*  2.27
ROW  population: Z2,  -4.63  -1.27
ROW income: Z3,  -8.38t  -1.57
Price times  income:  P,  Z3,  2.17*  2.29
Oil shock dummy: D,,  0.33t  1.60
Trend:  T,  0.26t  1.52
R-square between  observed and
predicted  0.98
Durbin-Watson  statistic  2.09
First-order condition:
Soymeal exports:  Q,  -0.22  -1.20
Real soybean  price:  W,,  1.20*  6.37
Real ocean freight:  W2,  -0.06  -0.45
8o  -0.04t  -1.42
l,  0.04t  1.40
Oil  shock dummy:  Dt,  -0.30t  -1.29
Trend:  T,  0.32*  1.46
R-square between  observed  and
predicted  0.76
Durbin-Watson  statistic  2.15
Note:  * Indicates  significance  at the 0.05  level  using  a  two-tail  test.  t
Indicates  significance  at  the 0.05  level  using  a  one-tail  test.  $ Indi-
cates  significance  at the 0.10 level using  a one-tail  test.
variables  and was collected  from the International  Monetary  Fund publication:  Interna-
tional Financial  Statistics (1992,  1994).
Since equations  (11)  and  (12)  represent  a nonlinear  simultaneous  equations  system,
they were estimated using nonlinear three-stage least squares (N3SLS). All the exogenous
variables  in the system were  used as  instruments.  The results of estimating these  equa-
tions  are shown in table 2. In the demand regression,  soymeal  and fishmeal prices have
their  expected  signs and  are  statistically  significant  at the 5%  level.  While the positive
coefficient  of the variable PZ 3, dampens  the  strong negative magnitude of the  soymeal
price coefficient,  it also  offsets the negative coefficient  of the income variable.  Further,
the  population variable  has  a statistically  insignificant  impact  on demand.  In  the  first-
order  condition  regression,  soymeal  exports  have  a negative  coefficient  implying  that
marginal  cost  is decreasing  in output;  however, the  coefficient on this variable is statis-
tically insignificant.  The positive and significant coefficient of soybean price is consistent
with  its expected  effect  on marginal  cost; while ocean  freight rates has  a nonsignificant
negative  coefficient.  The  relevant  coefficients  for  calculating  market  power  are  80=
-0.04 and  1= 0.04. Both the coefficients  are statistically different from zero at the 10%
level using  a one-tail  test.  They  are  so  close to  zero,  however,  that testing  this  at any
stricter significance  level is inconsequential.  The results show that, even before the entry
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of Argentinean  firms,  the  world export market  was  extremely competitive;  the index of
market power being A=0.04.  The effect of entry by firms from Argentina does result in
A falling  to  zero.  Although  the  change  in A is  very  small,  it  certainly  reinforces  that
soymeal  exporting  is perfectly  competitive.
Summary
The  aim of this  article  has been  to  determine  the  magnitude of market  imperfection  in
the world market for soymeal exports,  an industry where firms based in developed coun-
tries  are competing  with those from developing  countries.  An earlier study by Yamazaki,
Paarlberg,  and Thursby  found  the soybean processing  industry to be perfectly  competi-
tive; however,  their  study used a calibration  method to measure  the degree of competi-
tiveness  such that no  statistical  confidence  can be  attached  to  their results.  In contrast,
the  present  study  has  used  a  structural  econometric  model  to  estimate  the  degree  of
market power  in  the  soymeal export  market.  The results  presented  in this  article  show
that the world  market for soymeal exports  is perfectly  competitive,  which does  confirm
the earlier result  of Yamazaki,  Paarlberg, and  Thursby.
[Received December 1995; final version received December 1996.]
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